

## BENJAMIN BAYER

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### EDUCATION

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, M.A. in Philosophy, December 2000; Ph.D. in Philosophy, October 2007  
Lawrence University (Appleton, WI), B.A. in Philosophy (minor: physics), June 1998, *cum laude*  
Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, 1994–1995 (international politics; transferred)

### EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

Visiting assistant professor, Department of Philosophy, Loyola University New Orleans, Fall 2010–Present  
Adjunct professor, Metropolitan State College of Denver, Spring 2010  
Visiting assistant professor, Department of Philosophy, Colorado College, Fall 2008–Fall 2009  
Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Loyola University of Chicago, Fall 2007–Spring 2008  
Teaching assistant, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois, Fall 1998–Spring 2007

### AREA OF SPECIALIZATION

Epistemology, free will and determinism

### AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Logic, ethics, history of modern philosophy

### DISSERTATION

Title: *Varieties of Naturalized Epistemology: Criticisms and Alternatives*, University of Illinois, 2007  
Committee: Gary Ebbs (Indiana University), Jonathan Waskan, Arthur Melnick, Patrick Maher. (See abstract below.)

### PUBLISHED ARTICLES (PEER-REVIEWED)

“The Elusiveness of Doxastic Compatibilism,” *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 52(3), 2015.  
“How we Choose our Beliefs” (as second author, with Gregory Salmieri, Boston University), *Philosophia* 42, 2014  
“Internalism Empowered: How to Bolster a Theory of Justification with a Direct Realist Theory of Awareness,” *Acta Analytica*, December 2012  
“A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct-Realist Foundationalism,” *Synthese*, June 2011  
“Quine’s Pragmatic Solution to Skeptical Doubts,” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, May 2010  
“How Not to Critique Quine: Evaluating Kim’s Alternatives to Naturalized Epistemology,” *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, December 2007

### PUBLISHED ARTICLES (INVITED)

“Comments on ‘The Underdetermination Objection to Bare Difference Arguments,’” *Southwestern Philosophy Review*, July 2013  
“Keeping Up Appearances: Reflections on the Debate over Perceptual Infallibilism,” in *Concepts and their Role in Knowledge: Reflections on Objectivist Epistemology*, Gotthelf and Lennox (eds.), University of Pittsburgh Press (2013)

### PUBLISHED BOOK REVIEWS

“Review of *Causality and Explanation* by Wesley Salmon,” *Review of Metaphysics*, March 2000

### UNDER REVIEW

“A Positive Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Possibility” (under submission with *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*)

### IN PREPARATION

“Manipulation Counterexamples to Deliberation Compatibilism”  
“Nurturing our Better Nature: Probing the Interplay between Heredity and Choice in Human Moral Character Development,” as second author with Gena Gorlin (Boston University), sponsored by a Templeton Genetics and Human Agency grant (University of Virginia)

## PRESENTATIONS

- “A Positive Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Possibility.” Presented at the Southern Epistemology Conference, Department of Philosophy, Loyola New Orleans, October 2015.
- “A Positive Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Possibility.” Presented at Science and Certainty: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Department of Philosophy, UC San Diego, May 2015.
- “Belief Ownership without Belief Authorship: Agent Reliabilists’ Unlucky Gambit against Reflective Luck.” Presented at the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Vancouver, BC, April 2015.
- “Why Internalists Need an Enriched Theory of Perceptual and Conceptual Awareness to Escape from Bergmann’s Dilemma.” Presented at the 9<sup>th</sup> International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication, University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia, May 2013
- “Believing at Will and the Will to Believe the Truth.” Presented at the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Atlanta, GA, December 2012
- “Nested Testimony, Nested Probability, and a Defense of Testimonial Reductionism.” Presented at the Northwest Philosophy Conference, Lewis and Clark College, November 2011 (trip cancelled but comments received)
- “How Understanding the Nature of Perception Helps Solve Central Problems in Epistemology,” Seminar, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey, February 21, 2010 [Invited]
- “Taking Sellarsian Holism Seriously.” Presented at the American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago, IL, April 2007
- “Neglecting Indeterminacy and Behaviorism: Kim’s Critique of Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology.” Presented at the American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago, IL, April 2006
- “The Myth of the Given, or the Myth of the Taken?.” Presented at Concepts workshop, Conference sponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Department of History and Philosophy of Science and the Anthem Foundation, Pittsburgh, PA, Spring 2004 [Invited]

## COMMENTARY

- Comments on “The Insufficiency of Explanationism,” by T. Ryan Bylerly. Presented at the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, San Diego, CA, April 18<sup>th</sup>, 2014.
- Comments on “A Frankfurt Example to End All Frankfurt Examples, by James Cain. Presented at the American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago, IL, February 28, 2014.
- Comments on “The Underdetermination Objection to Bare Difference Arguments.” Presented at the Southwest Philosophy Conference, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, November 2012.
- Comments on “Mentalism and the Rochester Account of Evidential Support,” by Alexander Arnold. Presented at the Northwest Philosophy Conference, Lewis and Clark College, November 2011 (trip cancelled, comments delivered)
- Comments on “Scientific Realism Defended,” by Gerald Doppelt. Presented at the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, San Diego, CA, April 23, 2011
- Comments on “Pragmatic Encroachment Penalized,” by Michael Shaffer. Presented at the American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Minneapolis, MN, March 31, 2011
- Comments on “Adaptive Forgetting—Why Naturalistic Epistemology Needs the Social Sciences,” by Clyde Dunton-Gallagher. Presented at the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, April 16, 2010
- Comments on “The Missing Shade of Blue and the Prospects of Concept Empiricism,” by Par Sundstrom. Presented at the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Pasadena, CA, March 2008

## OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

- Editor and contributor, [www.checkyourpremises.org](http://www.checkyourpremises.org), the blog of the Ayn Rand Society (a professional society affiliated with the APA Eastern Division)
- Indexing work for the following books:
- The Blackwell Companion to Ayn Rand*, Gotthelf and Salmieri (eds.). Wiley-Blackwell, 2016
- Concepts and Their Role in Knowledge: Reflections on Objectivist Epistemology*, Gotthelf and Lennox (eds.). University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013
- Metaethics, Egoism, and Virtue: Ayn Rand’s Normative Theory*, Gotthelf and Lennox (eds.). University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011
- Referee, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Synthese*, *Acta Analytica*, *Philosophia*, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*
- Reader, Continuum International Publishing Group
- Chair of the following conference sessions:
- “Practical Necessity and Moral Heroism,” at the New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility, Murphy Institute, Tulane University, November 2015.
- “Risky Predictions,” at Science and Certainty: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Department of Philosophy, UC San Diego, May 2015.

Morning program, Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, Loyola University New Orleans, April 2015.  
“Scientific Cumulativity and Conceptual Change: The Case of ‘Temperature,’” Workshop on Concepts, Induction, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Pittsburgh, PA, September 2010  
“Coherentism and Truth,” by William Roche, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago, IL, April 2008

Senior thesis reader (Jamie Grasse, Matthias Barker), Colorado College, 2008–2009

Conference committee chair, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) graduate philosophy conference committee, Spring 2002

Conference committee member, UIUC graduate philosophy conference, Spring 2000

Referee, UIUC graduate philosophy conference, Spring 1999–Spring 2004

## COURSES TAUGHT

### AT LOYOLA NEW ORLEANS

Philosophy 122: Philosophy of the Human Person (/Introduction to Philosophy), Fall 2010–Spring 2011, Summer 2012–2015, Fall 2016 (eleven sections total)

Philosophy 282: Free Will and Determinism, Fall 2012–Spring 2013, Fall 2014, 2015, Summer 2016, Fall 2016 (ten sections total)

Nursing 905: Ethics and Social Justice, Summer 2014–2016 (online, five sections total)

Philosophy 206: Formal Logic, Spring 2016 (one section total)

Philosophy 294: Philosophic Themes in Ayn Rand, Spring 2016 (two sections total)

Philosophy 270: Philosophy of Knowledge, Fall 2011–Spring 2012, Fall 2015 (six sections total)

Philosophy 294: Free Will in Action and Thought, Fall 2014 (majors course)

Philosophy 201: Practical Logic, Fall 2010, Fall 2011–Spring 2012, Spring 2014–Spring 2015, Summer 2011–15 (online), (sixteen sections total)

Philosophy 252: Making Moral Decisions, Fall 2013–Spring 2014, Spring 2015, Spring 2016 (nine sections total)

Philosophy 220: Epistemology (majors course), Fall 2013

Philosophy 465: Introduction to Analytic Philosophy (majors course), Spring 2011

### AT METROPOLITAN STATE COLLEGE OF DENVER

Philosophy 1110: Language, Logic and Persuasion (Introductory Logic/Critical Thinking), Spring 2010 (3 sections)

### AT COLORADO COLLEGE

Philosophy 301: Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy, Fall 2009 (Block 1)

Philosophy 229: Philosophy of Language, Fall 2009 (Block 2)

Philosophy 201: History of Modern Philosophy (Descartes to Kierkegaard), Spring 2009 (Blocks 6 and 7)

Philosophy 102: Philosophical Argumentation and Writing, Spring 2009 (Block 5)

Philosophy 226: Formal Logic, Fall 2008 (Block 4) and Fall 2009 (Block 4)

Philosophy 246: Environmental Ethics, Fall 2008 (Block 2)

Philosophy 227: Epistemology, Fall 2008 (Block 1)

### AT LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

Philosophy 175: Theory of Knowledge, Fall 2007–Spring 2008 (two sections total)

Philosophy 174: Introduction to Logic, Fall 2007–Spring 2008 (two sections total)

### AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Philosophy 102: Logic and Reasoning, Summer 2002 (one section), Fall 2005–Spring 2007 (six sections total)

Philosophy 101: Introduction to Philosophy, Spring 2002–Spring 2003 (four sections total)

## DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Title: *Varieties of Naturalized Epistemology: Criticisms and Alternatives*

“Naturalized epistemology”—the recent attempt to transform the theory of knowledge into a branch of natural science—is often criticized for dispensing with the distinctively philosophical content of epistemology. In this dissertation, I argue that epistemologists are correct to reject naturalism, but that new arguments are needed to show why this is so. I establish my thesis first by evaluating two prominent varieties of naturalism—“optimistic” and “pessimistic”—and then by offering a proposal for how a new version of non-naturalistic epistemology must move forward. “Optimistic naturalism” attempts to use scientific methods to give positive answers to traditional epistemological questions. Epistemologists, for example, are urged to draw on psychology and evolutionary biology in order to show our beliefs are justified. I argue that this project fails. First, the common naturalistic thesis that theory is underdetermined by evidence poses difficulties for the optimist’s attempt to show that our beliefs *are* justified, even according to naturalized standards. Second, while critics usually contest naturalists’ logical right to use the concept of normative *justification*, I suggest that a deeper problem is with the naturalists’ use of the concept of *belief*. Naturalistic philosophy of mind, while perhaps acceptable for other purposes, does not deliver a concept of “belief” consistent with the constraints and needs of naturalized epistemology. “Pessimistic naturalism”—Quine’s project—takes it for granted that “belief” is problematic and logical justification elusive, and instead offers a pragmatic account of the development of our theory of the world. This project, while deeply unsatisfactory to the traditional epistemologist, also faces the challenge of privileging scientific discourse over other pragmatically successful modes of discourse. Whatever its merits, we can undermine its motivation by challenging the underdetermination thesis it rests on. We can do this by appealing to facts about scientific practice that undermine the conception of confirmation driving the thesis, by appealing to other facts about scientific practice, and by challenging some philosophical preconceptions, in order to make room for a new brand of inductivist foundationalism.

#### ACADEMIC HONORS AND AWARDS

Graduate travel stipend, American Philosophical Association, Central Division conference, Chicago, IL, Spring 2006; Spring 2007  
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Department of Philosophy fellowships, 1998–1999, 2001–2002  
Farley Prize in Philosophy for outstanding senior in philosophy at Lawrence University, Spring 1998

#### MISC. PHILOSOPHICAL EMPLOYMENT

Research assistant to Thomas Beauchamp, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown U., Fall 1994–Spring 1995

#### COURSES ASSISTED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Philosophy 105: Introduction to Ethics (Wright Neely), Spring 2001  
Philosophy 101: Introduction to Philosophy (Richard Schacht), Fall 2000  
Philosophy 105: Introduction to Ethics (James Wallace), Spring 2000  
Philosophy 321: Moral Philosophy (James Wallace), Fall 1999  
Philosophy 214: Moral Problems in Medicine and Biology (James Wallace), Fall 1999  
Philosophy 321: Moral Philosophy (Marcia Baron), Spring 1999  
Philosophy 101: Introduction to Philosophy (Wright Neely), Fall 1998

#### PHILOSOPHY COURSEWORK AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

##### Epistemology and philosophy of language

Philosophy 330: Epistemology: Skepticism (Gary Ebbs)  
Philosophy 353: Formal Logic and Philosophy (Gary Ebbs)  
Philosophy 417: Seminar in Semantics (Gary Ebbs)  
Philosophy 423: Seminar in Theory of Knowledge: Testimony (Gary Ebbs)  
Philosophy 483: Individual Topics: Analyticity/The internalism-externalism debate (Gary Ebbs)  
Philosophy 483: Individual Topics: McDowell and Sellars on the “myth of the given” (Gary Ebbs)

##### Philosophy of Science

Philosophy 317: Scientific Thought I (Patrick Maher)  
Philosophy 318: Scientific Thought II (Patrick Maher)  
Philosophy 417: Seminar in the Philosophy of Science: Induction (Patrick Maher)

##### Ethics and Metaethics

Philosophy 321: Moral Philosophy (Marcia Baron)  
Philosophy 329: Value Theory (Richard Schacht)  
Philosophy 411: Seminar in Ethical Theory: Practical Reasoning (James Wallace)

##### History of Philosophy

Philosophy 224: Recent European Philosophy (William Schroeder)  
Philosophy 310: Classical Ancient Philosophers (Robert Wengert)  
Philosophy 313: American Philosophy (Wright Neely)  
Philosophy 401: Seminar in the History of Philosophy: Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (Arthur Melnick)

#### REFERENCES

##### Graduate committee references

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Jonathan Waskan (retired from the  
profession)  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign  
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810 S. Wright St.  
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##### Teaching/departmental references

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##### Research references

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