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November 01, 2007

A new paper: Quine's acquiescence in skepticism

A chapter salvaged from the dissertation, to be used as a job market writing sample and journal submission:

Quine's Acquiescence in Skepticism
(November 1, 2007) (DOC) (HTML) (PDF)
I examine a series of criticisms that have been leveled against Quine's naturalized epistemology, regarding its confrontation with the problem of skepticism. Barry Stroud and Michael Williams, assuming that Quine wishes to refute skepticism, argue that Quine not only fails to undertake this refuation, but is also committed to theses (such as the inscrutability of reference and the underdetermination of theory by evidence) which imply versions of skepticism of their own. In Quine's defense, Roger Gibson argues that Quine can succeed in showing skeptical doubts to be incoherent. But I contend that both parties of this dispute wrongly assume that Quine wishes to defeat the skeptic. Instead, Quine is happy to "acquiesce" in skepticism. No logical justification of our scientific beliefs is possible on his view. But pragmatic justification is possible, and acknowledging that this is his view this leads to the resolution of a number of interpretive quandaries.

Posted by Ben at November 1, 2007 01:58 AM

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