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November 02, 2008

New paper: Direct Realist Abstractionism

NEW: In Search of Direct Realist Abstractionism

(November 2, 2008) (DOC) (PDF)

Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology bears no relevance to the goal of traditional epistemology: the goal of providing first-person guidance in the achievement of truth. In this paper, I apply insight about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a solution to the epistemic regress problem, as traditional a problem for epistemic normativity as one could find. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of justification, but only if it is supplemented by an abstractionist theory of concept-formation, the view that it is possible to abstract concepts directly from the empirically given. Critics of direct realist solutions are thus correct that an account of direct perception by itself does not provide an adequate account of justification. However a direct realist account of perception can inform the needed theory of concept-formation, and leading critics of abstractionism like McDowell and Sellars, direct realists about perception themselves, fail to appreciate the ways in which their own views about perception help fill gaps in earlier accounts of abstractionism. Recognizing this undercuts both their objections to abstractionism and therefore their objections to foundationalism, as well.


Posted by Ben at November 2, 2008 07:58 PM

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