

## Philosophy of mind (focus on methodology)

Sample syllabus

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### Course description

Philosophy of mind is essentially an application of the philosophy of science to a traditional problem of metaphysics: the relationship between the mental and the physical. It relates to the philosophy of science because philosophers who examine the relationship between mind and body seek to understand the same types of explanatory or identity relationships they exploit in understanding, say, the relationship between temperature and molecular motion.

It should, therefore, not be surprising that some of the earliest lengthy speculation about the philosophy of mind emerges in the early days of the scientific revolution. We thus begin by examining early modern dualists and anti-dualists, with special attention to the emergence of the split between the rival methodologies of conceptual analysis and naturalism. (The emphasis will be placed on *anti-dualism*, rather than materialism *per se*, because materialist and idealist critiques of dualism have more in common than is usually appreciated.) Though the distinction sometimes maps onto that between dualism and anti-dualism, this is not always the case, as we shall see that there remains an influential set of conceptual-analytic arguments against dualism, as well, both in the early modern period through to the twentieth century.

The fact that anti-dualist, materialist positions are usually associated with naturalistic methodology poses a challenge to their viability. Naturalistic methodology does not attempt to provide knock-down metaphysical arguments; instead it appeals to best explanations and other pragmatic guidance for forming theories. But when pragmatism becomes the rationale for a metaphysical position, what counts as an acceptable metaphysics becomes a matter of the most relevant values of the community, and it is debatable whether these are always identical to the values of materialistic science. So either materialism is no longer implied by naturalism, or there is reason to abandon naturalism. And if we must, therefore, adopt a non-naturalistic form of conceptual analysis, is this methodology more conducive to anti-dualism, or to dualism?

### Texts

- John Heil, *Philosophy: A Guide and Anthology* (Oxford, 2004)
- John Heil, *Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction* (Routledge, 2004)
- Course pack

### Lecture and reading schedule

#### *Early modern figures and the emergence of the dualism, anti-dualism debate*

##### *Scientific background*

- Galileo: from *The Assayer*

##### *Early modern conceptual analysis: dualism*

- Descartes' interactionism: from *Meditations*
- Locke on primary and secondary qualities: from *Essay*
- Leibniz's parallelism, from *Monadology*

##### *Early modern conceptual analysis: anti-dualism*

- Spinoza's dual-aspect theory: from *Ethics*
- D'Holbach's revision of Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction: from *System of Nature*
- Berkeley's idealism: *Treatise*

##### *Early modern naturalism: anti-dualism*

- Hobbes' explanationist argument: *Leviathan*
- Le Mettrie: *Man a Machine*

## ***Contemporary anti-dualists***

### *Conceptual analysis: logical behaviorism*

- Ryle, "Descartes' Myth"
- Hempel, "The Logical Analysis of Psychology"

### *Naturalism: identity theory*

- U.T. Place, "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?"
- J.J.C. Smart, "Sensation and Brain Processes"

### *Conceptual analysis: logical functionalism and eliminativism*

- Lewis, "Psychophysical and theoretical identification"
- Churchland "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes"
- Stich, From *Folk Psychology to Cognitive Psychology*

### *Naturalism: explanationist functionalism*

- Hillary Putnam, "The Nature of Mental States"
- Jerry Fodor, "Special Sciences (or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)"

### *Conceptual analysis: two-factor logical functionalism about belief content*

- Jaegwon Kim, "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction," or from *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough*
- Frank Jackson, from *From Metaphysics to Ethics*

### *Contemporary idealism*

- Foster, "The succinct case for idealism"

## ***Contemporary responses to twentieth century anti-dualism***

### *Conceptual analysis: dualism or mysterianism about phenomenal consciousness*

- Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity"
- Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia"
- David Chalmers, "Facing up the Problem of Consciousness"
- Colin McGinn, "Can we Solve the Mind-Body Problem?"

### *Naturalism: property dualism*

- Searle, "The Irreducibility of Consciousness"

### *Naturalism: pure explanationism*

- Cummins, from *Meaning and Mental Representation*
- Waskan, from *Models and Cognition*

### *Naturalism: relativism*

- Stich, from *Deconstructing the Mind*

### *Subject naturalism: interpretation theories*

- Davidson, "Radical Interpretation"
- Dennett, "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology"
- Quine, on empathy, from *The Pursuit of Truth*
- Gordon and Goldman: Simulation Theory

### *Conceptual analysis: the body-body problem*

- Montero, Papineau