November 01, 2007
A new paper: Quine's acquiescence in skepticism
A chapter salvaged from the dissertation, to be used as a job market writing sample and journal submission:
Quine's Acquiescence in Skepticism
(November 1, 2007) (DOC) (HTML) (PDF)
I examine a series of criticisms that have been leveled against Quine's naturalized epistemology, regarding its confrontation with the problem of skepticism. Barry Stroud and Michael Williams, assuming that Quine wishes to refute skepticism, argue that Quine not only fails to undertake this refuation, but is also committed to theses (such as the inscrutability of reference and the underdetermination of theory by evidence) which imply versions of skepticism of their own. In Quine's defense, Roger Gibson argues that Quine can succeed in showing skeptical doubts to be incoherent. But I contend that both parties of this dispute wrongly assume that Quine wishes to defeat the skeptic. Instead, Quine is happy to "acquiesce" in skepticism. No logical justification of our scientific beliefs is possible on his view. But pragmatic justification is possible, and acknowledging that this is his view this leads to the resolution of a number of interpretive quandaries.
Posted by Ben at 01:58 AM | Comments (0)
September 08, 2006
New paper online: "Escape from the Humean Predicament"
This is a fairly polished draft of my writing sample. Here is the abstract:
In this paper, I outline a new strategy for answering skepticism, inspired by the words of Quine. It begins with the assumption that if skeptics have the right to make scientific assumptions for the sake of reductio ad absurdum, then anti-skeptics also have the right to make further free use of science in order to block the reductio. I illustrate how this strategy may be applied to three related skeptical conclusions: Quine's own underdetermination thesis, Humean inductive skepticism, and anti-foundationalism. Underdetermination is undermined by an appeal to scientific practice to see that it relies on a crude and unrealistic hypothetico-deductivist conception of confirmation. The classical Humean problem of induction can be resolved by appeal to a material theory of induction which recognizes diverse methods of confirmation practiced by scientists in different domains of fact. Finally, by appealing appealing to psychological evidence regarding perception and concept-formation, I show how the regress of inductive justification can be terminated in perceptual foundations.
Posted by Ben at 06:50 PM | Comments (0)
New draft of paper: "On Grasping the Whole Quine: Lessons from Kim's Critique"
This is a rewritten version of an earlier posted paper, which I am now submitting to journals. Here is the abstract:
This paper evaluates Jaegwon Kim’s influential critique of Quine’s naturalized epistemology and urges that a proper critique must evaluate the fundamental principles of Quine’s philosophy. Kim argues that Quine forces a false choice between traditional deductivist foundationalism and naturalized epistemology, contending that there are viable alternative epistemological projects. But Quine would reject these alternatives by reference to the same fundamental principles (underdetermination, indeterminacy of translation, extensionalism and behaviorism) that led him to reject foundationalism. Understanding Quine’s fundamentals also helps to defuse Kim’s charge that naturalized epistemology is inadequate or incoherent to the extent that it dispenses with epistemic normativity.
Posted by Ben at 06:48 PM | Comments (0)
March 14, 2006
APA abstract up
They've got my Kim/Quine paper abstract on the APA web site. Unfortunately it's the old abstract and title. I don't know why they didn't use the new one I suggested.
Posted by Ben at 02:09 AM | Comments (0)
December 28, 2005
New paper: Neglecting the naturalism in Quine's naturalized epistemology: Lessons from Kim's failed critique
I have a new paper online. This is an expanded version of a section I from my dissertation that I've done at one conference, and will be doing at another (the Central Division APA) in April. Here's the abstract:
Jaegwon Kim's influential argument against Quine's naturalized epistemology is examined, and shown to neglect crucial aspects of Quine's basic philosophic approach, methodological naturalism. First, Kim suggests that Quine presents a false alternative between the Cartesian quest for certainty and naturalized epistemology, arguing that Quine ignores normative alternatives to Cartesianism. Kim's critique fails here, because he mischaracterizes the scope of Quine's project: his naturalism, particularly via his indeterminacy of translation thesis, has the effect of ruling out far more alternatives than Kim suspects. Second, Kim suggests that Quine's putative rejection of normativity is a problem for the evaluation of cognitive outputs, but Kim ignores Quine's behaviorism, which obviates his need for a normative interpretive theory of beliefs. It is suggested that debating about the naturalism's relation to normativity is superfluous: to critique naturalized epistemology, it is necessary to attack the basic naturalistic motivation that fuels the indeterminacy thesis and associated principles.
I'm looking to submit this for publication soon, so I welcome comments.
UPDATE: Left comments on a sympathetic blog entry by Majikthise.
Posted by Ben at 08:41 PM | Comments (0)